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In 1992, the governments of the United States, Canada, and Mexico signed the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).' NAFTA became effective on Jan-
uary 1, 1994.2 The overall affect of NAFTA has been positive. Cross-border trade between
the United States and Mexico rose 113 percent between 1993 and 1998. 3 United States'
exports to Mexico had grown to $111.35 billion by 2000.' NAFTA created 350,000
American jobs.' The agreement also helped spark much needed economic reform in
Mexico.6 NAFTA has become the world's most productive trade alliance, employing
almost 400 million people who produce $10 trillion in products and services.7 The agree-
ment has not reached its full potential, however, due to controversy over cross-border
trucking.
I. Introduction
This comment will address the history behind the NAFTA truck debate, the decision
of the NAFTA arbitration panel, and the differences in trucking regulation between the
United States and Mexico. The paper will then focus on concerns held by the American
public regarding compliance with the arbitration panel's decision, and opening the bor-
der to Mexican trucks. The comment will then address the political dimensions of the
NAFTA truck debate, and recently passed Congressional legislation. The author will also
suggest how new technology can streamline border inspections, thereby allowing for
more efficient movement of goods.
II. History Behind the Dispute
Under the terms of NAFTA, Mexican trucks were to be permitted to drive through-
out the United States-Mexico border region by December 18, 1995.' NAFTA also pro-
vided that trucks from any NAFTA nation could drive anywhere in any NAFTA country
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
2. NAFTA art. 2203.
3. United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) At Five Years: What It Means For The U.S. and Mexico, at http://www.usmcoc.org/
naftafor.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001) [hereinafter NAFTA at Five Years]; United States-
Mexico Chamber of Commerce, United States Exports To Mexico, at http://www.usmcoc.org
eco2.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
4. NAFTA at Five Years, supra note 3.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchinson, Truck Stop (Jul. 6, 2001), at http://www.senate.gov/-hutchison/
cctruck.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
8. John Harrington, United States-Mexico Transportation: Full NAFTA Implementation Essential,
United States-Mexico Chamber of Commerce, at http://www.usmcoc.org/transp.html (last
visited Aug. 24, 2001).
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by January 1, 2000. 9 However, instead of complying with NAFTA, the Clinton admin-
istration suspended the cross-border trucking clause on December 17, 1995, one day
before it was to take effect.'"
A. CLOSING THE BORDER
On December 18, 1995, the Department of Transportation (DOT) began accept-
ing applications from Mexican motor carriers to operate in the United States." How-
ever, prior to the border's opening, DOT Secretary Federico Pefia announced a freeze
on processing application from Mexican carriers. 2 Secretary Pefia explained that the
freeze on applications from Mexican carriers was due to the lack of harmonization
between Mexican and American safety standards. 3 Administration officials claimed that
Mexican motor carriers were not safe, and that the action was taken to protect American
motorists. 4 The Clinton administration cited drastic differences in the enforcement and
application of Mexican and American safety standards." They also claimed that state
and federal officials were unable to effectively enforce American standards on Mexican
carriers. 16
B. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION STUDY
The Clinton administration needed proof to back up its allegations, so it requested
the Texas Department of Transportation (TXDOT) to conduct a study on Mexican truck
safety.' 7 TXDOT conducted this study between December 19, 1995 and May 3, 1996."1
The study found that Mexican trucks failed safety inspections 48.7 percent of the time
in Laredo, and 77.4 percent failed in El Paso.'9 This study gave the administration the
ammunition it needed to keep the border closed.
9. NAFTA Annex I, Schedule of United States.
10. Patrick Osio, Jr., The NAFTA Truck Issue Is Not About Safety, at http://www.hispanicvista.com/
html/010723osio.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
11. Federico Pefia, NAFTA Border Opening Remarks (Dec. 18, 1995), available at http://
www.dot.gov/affairs/1995/nafl8sp.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
12. Peter J. Cazamias, Comment, The U.S.-Mexican Trucking Dispute: A Product of a Politicized
Trade Agreement, 33 TEX. INT'L L.I. 349, 353 (1998).
13. Id.
14. Osio, supra note 10.
15. Cazamias, supra note 12, at 353.
16. Public Citizen, The Coming NAFTA Crash: The Deadly Impact of a Secret NAFTA Tri-
bunal's Decision to Open U.S. Highways to Unsafe Mexican Trucks, Global Trade Watch
(Feb. 2001), available at http://www.tradewatch.orglnafta/reports/truckstudy.htm (last visited
Sept. 7, 2002).
17. Osio, supra note 10.
18. Id.
19. Id.; Ignore Fears, Let Mexican Trucks Roll, CRAIN'S DETROIT Bus., Jul. 23, 2001, at 8.
Winter/Spring 2002 283
C. DRAYAGE SYSTEM
The closing of the United States-Mexico border in 1995 left intact a situation where
many Mexican trucks were only allowed to operate in narrow commercial zones, extend-
ing twelve to twenty-five miles into the United States.2" Instead of the free flow of traffic
and goods that the drafters of NAFTA envisioned, a drayage system persisted.
Under a drayage system, goods are loaded onto Mexican trucks and driven to a
border crossing, such as Nuevo Laredo. The goods are then off-loaded onto a short-haul
truck, which is driven across the Rio Grande to Laredo where the goods are then off-
loaded again onto an American rig. This is an inefficient, uneconomical solution that
can increase merchandise-shipping time-sometimes by weeks-and allows inspectors
to pilfer goods from trailers.
21
D. SEEDS OF DISCONTENT
The Clinton administration's decision to keep the border closed has led many
Mexicans to feel like they are being taken advantage of by their wealthier neighbor to
the north.22 This led the Mexican government to challenge Clinton's decision before a
NAFTA arbitration tribunal in 1998.23
III. The Arbitration Dispute
A. MEXICAN ARGUMENT
In its Chapter 2024 arbitration, Mexico claimed that the United States violated
Annex I by not phasing out restrictions on cross-border motor-carrier services. 2 Mexico
further claimed that the United States violated articles 1202 and 120326 of NAFTA by
refusing to open the border.
27
20. See Revision of Regulations and Application Form for Mexican-Domiciled Motor Carriers to
Operate in U.S. Municipalities and Commercial Zones on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 66 Fed.
Reg. 22,328 (Dep't Trans. May 3, 2001) [hereinafter Revision of Regulations]. The size of
commercial zones on the U.S.-Mexico border is determined through a formula based on the
size of the municipality. See 49 C.F.R. §372.303 (2001).
21. Personal knowledge acquired while working in Latin American Operations at J.C. Penney
Co. For a discussion of the drayage system see James Giermanski & David Neipert, The
Reregulation of Freight Forwarders in the USA and Its Impact On the USA-Mexico Border, 9
CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J. 11 (2000).
22. Dan Murphy, Mexico Protests US Truck Rules, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2001, at 6.
23. Public Citizen, supra note 16.
24. See NAFTA ch. 20. Chapter 20 sets out the rules for arbitration under the agreement.
25. In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Servs. (Mex. v. U.S.) at 1 (2001) [hereinafter Mex. v.
U.S.].
26. NAFTA arts. 1202, 1203.
27. Mex v. U.S., at 1.
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1. Article 1202
Dealing with national treatment, article 1202 states: "Each Party shall accord to
service providers of another Party, treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in
like circumstances, to its own service providers' 28 It further explains that this treatment
means "treatment no less favorable than the most favorable treatment accorded, in like
circumstances," by a state or province to service providers in the same nation.
29
This seems to indicate that Mexican trucks entering Texas, for instance, would have
to be given equal treatment as trucks entering the state from Oklahoma or Arkansas.
Closing the Rio Grande to Mexican trucks, apparently would violate article 1202 if the
Red and Sabine Rivers are not closed to trucks domiciled in other states. It also appears
to say that Texas, or for that matter the United States, would have to treat Mexican
trucks in an equal fashion with domestic carriers.
2. Article 1203
Article 1203 addresses most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. It reads, "[e]ach Party
shall afford service providers of another Party treatment no less favorable than it accords,
in like circumstances, to service providers of any other Party or of a non-Party.30 There-
fore, if the United States allows trucks from Canada, or any other nation, access to
American highways, it must extend the same courtesy to trucks from Mexico.
3. Mexico's Point of View
When read in this light, a quick examination of the facts reveals that the United
States has not fulfilled its obligations under articles 1202 and 1203. The Clinton admin-
istration's closing of the southern border obviously creates a situation where Mexican
trucks are not treated equally with their American counterparts. This appears to be a
clear violation of article 1202. The United States also regularly allows Canadian trucks
access to American highways. Since-with few exceptions-Mexican carriers are not
allowed equal access to our nation's roads, this looks like a violation of article 1203.
B. AMERICAN ARGUMENT
1. Articles 1202 and 1203
In its defense, the United States claimed that the "in like circumstances" language
of articles 1202 and 1203 means that the United States can treat Mexican carriers differ-
ently.3 The United States claimed that since "adequate procedures are not yet in place
[in Mexico] to ensure U.S. highway safety, NAFTA permits Parties to accord differential,
and even less favorable, treatment where appropriate to meet legitimate regulatory objec-
tives."32 The United States felt that its treatment of Mexican motor carriers was proper,
28. NAFTA art. 1202.
29. Id.
30. Id. art. 1203.
31. Mex. v. U.S., at 2, 3.
32. Id.
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since it was enacted "in order to address a legitimate regulatory objective."33 The United
States also claimed that allowing Canadian carriers onto American highways was not
a violation of most-favored-nation treatment "since the Canadian regulatory system is
'equivalent' to that of the United States:' and Canadian trucks are "in like circumstances'
vis-a-vis" American trucks.34
2. Article 2101
The United States employed article 2101 to bolster its case. Article 2101 states that
chapter 12 "shall not be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any
Party, of measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating to health
and safety and consumer protection.
" 35
3. American Point of View
This NAFTA provision seems to indicate that the Clinton White House was correct in
the action it took concerning the border. Mexican trucks do not receive equal treatment
for a simple reason: the Mexican regulatory system puts them in a situation where they
do not operate in like circumstances. This reading also indicates that the United States
has the right to maintain its sovereignty and maintain its own laws.
IV. Lack of Harmonization of Trucking Standards
The United States has a legitimate concern. Annex 915.5a-1(2)(a) required the stan-
dardization of truck weight and length, as well as safety and driver's license standards
between NAFTA nations. 36 Mexico agreed to improve its motor-carrier safety standards
to meet those of the United States; however, Mexican law was not upgraded to meet
basic American safety standards, such as hours-of-service restrictions, the use of log-
books, and roadside inspections.37 Mexican trucks can also be much heavier than their
American counterparts.3" American trucks are limited to a gross vehicle weight limit
of 80,000 pounds, whereas Mexican trucks can weigh up to 135,560 pounds.39 Many
Mexican trucks are also designed with walking-beam suspensions.4" These are heavier
duty suspension systems used for driving over dirt roads.4 Walking-beam suspensions
transfer vehicle weight to the road surface in a much more severe fashion than traditional
suspension systems.42 Thus, heavier weight combined with walking-beam suspensions,
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. NAFTA art. 2101.
36. Id. annex 915.5a-1(2)(a).
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means that Mexican trucks have the potential to create much greater damage to American
roads than their American counterparts.43
A. UPDATED MEXICAN TRUCKING REGULATIONS
Mexico recently passed legislation to deal with American concerns in this area."
Nonetheless, the new rules still lag far behind those of the United States. Some major
problems with the new standards from the American point of view are:
* The trucking standards only apply to federal highways.45 More than 90 percent
of the roads traveled by Mexican motor carriers are under state or local juris-
diction. 6 This means that trucks traveling these roads are exempt from the
rules.
47
* The maximum time allowed for the inspection of a general cargo carrier is thirty
minutes, while the maximum time allotted for the inspection of a hazardous-
cargo carrier is twenty minutes.4" The United States imposes no time limit for
conducting an inspection.49
* Driver and company safety records will be difficult to track until a joint U.S.-
Mexico database is completed.5 °
The new rules still do not rise to American standards, even with the limitations
imposed on Mexican trucks by Mexico's Ministry of Transport and Communications.
The new rules contain no hours-of-service limitations; instead, "[t]he driver's hours of
service [are] designed by [the] company, according to its needs:' and new vehicles are
exempt from inspections and safety standards for two years after their manufacture date
(emphasis in original).51
A larger problem is that safety issues are treated in isolation. A truck can be found
to have a number of borderline problems, that cumulatively would take the truck off
the road in the United States, but it would still be allowed to roll the highways in
Mexico. 52 Finally, while fines are authorized by the new safety rules, no specific amounts
or deterrent effects are mentioned.53
43. Id.
44. "Mexican Standard NOM-068-SCT-2-2000, Ground Transportation-Federal Motor Transport
Service For Passengers, Tourism, Hauling and Private Transportation-Mechanical Safety Con-
ditions For Operating On National Roads and Bridges," D.O., 24 de julio de 2000 [hereinafter
Mexican Standard].
45. Public Citizen, Recent Mexican Trucking Rules Do Not Solve Serious Safety Hazards: NAFTA
Ruling Could Expose U.S. Public to Dangerous Cross-Border Trucks (Feb. 7, 2001), at http://
www.citizen.org/Press/truckregs.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2002); Mexican Standard §5.2.1
[hereinafter Recent Mexican Trucking Rules].
46. Recent Mexican Trucking Rules, supra note 45; Mexican Standard §5.2.1.
47. Recent Mexican Trucking Rules, supra note 45; Mexican Standard §5.2.1.
48. Recent Mexican Trucking Rules, supra note 45; Mexican Standard §5.2.1.2.
49. Recent Mexican Trucking Rules, supra note 45; Mexican Standard §5.2.1.2.





B. DIFFERENCES IN REGULATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO
To illustrate the difference in the two nations' safety standards, the following list of
infractions would earn an automatic out-of-service order in the United States, but would
merely incur a ticket in Mexico, with a promise to fix the problem in twenty days:
• Non-existent log book.54
* Incompatible hazardous materials in the same shipment.5
* Bulk loads improperly secured or blocked.56
* Identifications or warnings do not match hazardous material being hauled.57
* Missing more than 25 percent of anchoring components."
* Using tanks that were not designed or authorized to transport the products
being shipped.59
* Material that is leaking from a transport tank.
60
° Failing to carry appropriate emergency information.6
There are also a number of areas where an out-of-service order would be very likely
in the United States, but where Mexico would still only issue a ticket with a promise to
fix the problem in twenty days. Examples include:
* Missing or inoperable break lights.
* Worn or exposed wiring.
* No windshield wipers or spray jets.
* A shattered or missing windshield.
* Damaged tires.
* Wheel rims that are bent, broken, or cracked.
* Detached joints or loose steering wheel.
* Cracked brake drums.
• No seats in cab.
* No spring on mechanical suspension, among others.
62
V. Decision of the NAFTA Arbitration Panel
A. UNITED STATES BREACHED ITS DUTIES UNDER NAFTA
The differences in safety regulations and vehicle size standards between the United
States and Mexico appear to show that Mexico was in violation of NAFTA, by not
harmonizing safety standards with Canada and the United States, and that the United
49 C.F.R. §395.13 (2001); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. §173.24 (2001); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. Subch. B App. G (2000); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. §171.2 (2001); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. Subch. B App. G; Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. §130.21 (2001); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. Subch. B App. G; Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. §397.19 (2001); Mexican Standard §4.2.
49 C.F.R. Subch. B App. G; Mexican Standard §§4.1-4.18.
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States was justified in closing its border to Mexican trucks. The Chapter 20 arbitration
panel did not take this view, however. Instead, the panel sided with Mexico, stating:
"the U.S. blanket refusal to review and consider for approval any Mexican-owned carrier
applications for authority to provide cross-border trucking services, was and remains, a
breach of the U.S. obligations."63
The panel made clear that in its opinion the "in like circumstances language" of
articles 1202 and 1203 did not create "[a]n exception to these obligations. '64 The panel
explained this position by stating: "the proper interpretation of Article 1202 requires
that differential treatment should be no greater than necessary for legitimate regulatory
reasons, such as safety, and that such different treatment be equivalent to the treatment
accorded to domestic service providers."65
With the knowledge that motor carriers would have to fully comply with the stan-
dards of the nation in which they were providing the service, NAFTA was passed with the
intent of eliminating barriers to trade and facilitating cross-border movement of goods
and services. Therefore, the panelists believed that the "in like circumstances" language
could not be used to justify a ban on cross-border trucking services.66
B. THE UNITED STATES DOEs NOT HAVE TO PROVIDE
FOREIGN CARRIERS EQUAL TREATMENT
The panel concluded that the United States was in violation of NAFTA, because of
its "so-called 'blanket' ban" on allowing Mexican trucks onto American highways. 67 The
United States does not have to extend favorable treatment to all Mexican trucking firms,
however. The United States can deny a Mexican carrier the right to enter the United
States, if it may be unable to comply with American law.6 ' The panel also decided that a
NAFTA nation can implement different procedures for international motor carriers, to
ensure that they comply with the nation's safety standards. 69
VI. Current Debate
While the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision seems to be fair given the objectives
of the agreement, until recently there has been much debate in the United States over
how, when, and if to open the nation's southern border to Mexican trucks. A preliminary
opinion of the NAFTA arbitration panel released on November 29, 2000 stated that the
United States must open its roads to Mexican domiciled trucks, or face possible trade
sanctions.7 °
63. Mex. v. U.S., at 81.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 69.
66. Id. at 63, 69.
67. Id. at 81.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 82.
70. Public Citizen, supra note 16.
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A. POLITICAL ISSUES AND AMERICAN MISPERCEPTIONS
OF MEXICAN TRUCKS
Many Americans might be willing to accept trade sanctions due to fears of opening
the border. A number of misconceptions abound. Concern has been expressed over traf-
fic congestion,71 loss of American jobs,72 and, most importantly, the safety of American
motorists. 73 It is understandable that the American public feels this way, given the
amount of attention the opponents of free trade have given the subject. 74 Many of these
fears should evaporate, however, upon a closer examination of the economic and social
reality surrounding the situation.
1. Congestion
a. Congestion in the Border Region
Some United States residents along the nation's border with Mexico fear that opening
the border will create a large inflow of traffic and convert their quiet, small towns
into large, environmentally polluted truck stops. 75 This is a legitimate concern. The
state of Chihuahua estimates that it will have approximately 100,000 trucks spilling
across the border into small South Texas communities in two years. 76 This would be
a major problem for small, affluent, artistic communities such as Alpine, Texas, but
would be a blessing for neighboring cities like Presidio burdened by one of the highest
unemployment rates in the state.77 Presidio officials claim that every truck stop built in
the city would create around 100 jobs. 78
Texas and California are already devising ways to deal with possible congestion prob-
lems. Texas Proposition 2 authorizes TXDOT to issue general obligation bonds up to a
71. See Road Information Program, Stuck In Traffic: How Increasing Traffic Congestion Is
Putting the Brakes on Economic Growth, May 2001 available at http://www.tripnet.org/
StuckinTrafficReportMay0l.PDF (last visited July 14, 2002).
72. Chris DeLong, Brad DeLong, and Sherman Robinson, NAFTA and jobs, at http://www.
jbradford-delong.net/OpEd/naftaandjobs.html (last modified May 17, 1996).
73. Jim Hall, Opening Statement at the Third NTSB Public Hearing on Truck and Bus Safety:
The Highway Transportation Safety Aspects of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (Oct. 20-22, 1999) available at http://www.ntsb.gov/speeches/temp%5Fcheckhallmove/
jhc991020.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
74. NAFTA has come under heavy fire from all sides of the political spectrum. See, e.g., Oppo-
nents Buchanan, Nader Find Much Common Ground in American Experience Face-off, U.
TIMES Nov. 21, 2001, available at http://www.pitt.edu/utimes/issues/34/011121/05.html (last
visited Jan. 9, 2002); Bob Fitrakis, Nader For President, COLUMBUS ALIVEWIRED, available at
http://www.columbusalive.com/1996/19960403/bob.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
75. Gary Reaves, More Truck Controversy on Texas-Mexico Border, Jul. 30, 2001, at
http://www.wfaa.com/mainpack/l,2606,1129,00.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
76. Id.
77. Presidio County's unemployment rate as of Nov. 2001 stood at 20.4 percent, see Texas Work-
force Commission, County Current Unemployment Rates, at http://www.twc.state.tx.us/lmi/lfs/
type/unemployment/unemploymentcountycurrent.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
78. Reaves, supra note 75.
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sum of $175 million to help finance the construction of highways for low income com-
munities in the border region that badly need an updated infrastructure.79 The recently
passed80 Proposition 2 can help solve the problem faced by communities like Alpine
by providing money to build a bypass around the city. Similarly, California's senate is
debating legislation that would create a border-infrastructure financing authority, that
would issue bonds to construct similar projects on both sides of the border.8
b. Congestion in the Interior
While opening the United States-Mexico border will have a definite impact on
traffic congestion in the border-states, a common misconception among Americans is
that opening the southern border to Mexican trucks would increase motor-carrier traf-
fic nationwide. The numbers do not support this proposition. Trade between Canada
and Mexico amounts to a paltry $8 billion per year compared to U.S.-Mexico trade of
$190 billion. $7 billion of the Canada-Mexico trade is Canadian exports to Mexico. 82
The above numbers show that most NAFTA traffic generated in Mexico will be
bound for the United States, not Canada. Studies of the volume and flow of NAFTA
truck traffic show that the southern flow of goods from Canada and the northern flow of
goods from Mexico "overlap and dwindle" somewhere around Tennessee.83 The studies
show that most northbound truck traffic from Mexico does not venture north of the
Dallas-Ft. Worth Metroplex, and is nonexistent north of Kansas City.84 This indicates
that the vast majority of Mexican truck traffic will be limited to the states of Texas and
California, which are already gearing up to handle the inflow.85
2. Job Loss/Economic Decline
The prophets of doom and gloom have been predicting that millions of Americans
would lose their jobs due to NAFTA, and that our economy would take a corresponding
downward spiral.86 The opposite has in fact occurred. The Dow Jones Industrial Average
rose from 3798.40 in January 1994 when NAFTA took effect to a close of 10221.57
December 31, 2001.87 Likewise, the NASDAQ composite average rose from 800.47 in
January 1994 to a close of 1950.40 on December 31, 2001.8 United States unemployment
rates also dropped from 6.60 percent in January 1994 to 5.40 percent in December 2001.89
79. Humberto Sanchez, Paying For An Open Border, BOND BUYER, Sept. 10, 2001, 2001 WL
22613031.
80. Id.
81. Proclamation of Gov. Rick Perry, Nov. 30, 2001, at http://www.governor.state.tx.us.htm (last
visited Sept. 7, 2002).
82. David Savageau, NAFTA Trade Corridors, Bus. XPANSION J., Aug. 2000, available at http://




86. Alex Knapp, Why Free Trade Rocks, TECH NEWS, Mar. 27, 2001, at http://www.wpi.edu/News/
TechNews/010327/thevision.shtml (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
87. See Yahoo! Finance, at http://finance.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
88. See id.
89. See FreeLunch.com, at http://www.freelunch.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
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During the first five years of NAFTA's existence, the United States government estimates
that 11.1 million new jobs were created, and 350,000 of those were due to NAFTA.9 °
a. American Truck Drivers Have Not Lost Jobs
Fears that American truck drivers will lose jobs to their Mexican counterparts when
the border is opened are also widely exaggerated. Mexican trucking companies currently
operate around 375,000 trucks.9 This pales in comparison to the seven million trucks
currently operated in the United States.92 Given these numbers, Mexican trucking com-
panies only have 5.36 percent of the hauling capacity of the American trucking industry.
Thus, even if all of the trucks in Mexico were carrying loads in the United States, they
would hardly make a dent in the United States trucking industry.
It also seems unlikely that U.S. trucking companies will replace their American
workforce with Mexican truckers once the border is opened. While there is still plenty
of uncertainty over how the newly passed truck rules would apply in a situation of this
sort, it seems logical to think that U.S. employment law and standards would apply to
truckers employed by American companies; and operating in the United States. It also
stands to reason that if a situation of this sort did occur, the Teamsters or Canacar would
unionize the workers and demand wages comparable to other truck drivers operating in
the United States.
b. Mexican Truck Drivers Fear Opening the Border
to American Competition
Mexican truckers also fear the opening of the border.9 3 Most Mexican truckers fear
they cannot compete against the more modern and efficient American motor fleets.94
Mexican truckers are at a severe cost disadvantage because parts, fuel, trucks, and financ-
ing are significantly more expensive south of the border.9" For instance, a new Volvo or
Freightliner tractor-trailer truck costs $97,000 in Mexico versus $60,000 in the United
States.96 Financing on that truck would run 12 to 24 percent in Mexico, but would only
average 6 to 8 percent in the United States.97 The price per gallon of diesel fuel runs
$2.10 a gallon in Mexico and averages $1.40 a gallon in Texas. 98 Truck tires cost $340 a
piece in Mexico and only $260 in the United States.99 Canacar, Mexico's trucking union,
says "[tihe border must be completely closed to American trucks."'" Canacar has gone
90. NAFTA at Five Years, supra note 3.
91. No Truck With Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2001 at 35, available at 2001 WL 7319962.
92. Murphy, supra note 22, at 6; No Truck with Free Trade, supra note 91, at 35, available at 2001
WL 2510645.
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as far as asking the Mexican government to declare the NAFTA trucking provision null
and void.''
c. The American Trucking Industry Has Much to Gain
From Opening the U.S.-Mexico Border
American truckers would gain much from opening up the United States-Mexico
border. Mexican fleets currently control about 80 percent of the cross-border trucking
business.0 2 With lower costs and greater economies of scale, American trucking compa-
nies could easily capture this lucrative market. American firms would also gain much by
investing in Mexican trucking companies. Approximately 80 percent of Mexico's trade is
transported by truck.0 3 With wise investments, American companies would be able to
bring most of the revenue generated through Mexico's domestic trucking to the United
States.
d. Mercantilism vs. Economic Exchange
This doom-and-gloom mentality has been created by a sixteenth-century economic
concept known as mercantilism. Put simply, mercantilists believe that one man's profit
is another man's pain. Mercantilists advocate national regulation of foreign trade in
a manner that will increase exports and decrease imports, thereby creating a net
inflow of revenue.' 4 However, this theory is contrary to modern economic thought.'0 5
Modern economics has shown that profits are generated by "anticipating future events
and... adjusting... activities to the future state of the market."'0 6 Those who reap
economic rewards, do so because they are in the best position to meet the public's
demand for goods and services. Those who lose, do so because they missed in their
estimation of market demand, not because victory went to other players.
10 7
(i) Theory of Exchange
Generally speaking, rational individuals do not engage in an exchange they think
will make them worse off. Instead, rational individuals seek to maximize their utility.
10 8
101. Kraul, supra note 93.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See LUDWIG VON MISEs, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 664 (Henry Regnery
Co. 3d rev. 1966) (1949); see also PERCY L. GREAVES, JR., MISES MADE EASIER: A GLOSSARY
FOR LUDWIG VON MISEs' HUMAN ACTION 89 (1974); Laura LaHaye, Mercantilism, in THE
FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 534 (David R. Henderson, ed., 1993).
105. MisEs, supra note 104, at 53.
106. Id. at 664-65.
107. Id. at 665.
108. Utilitarianism is a theory made popular in the nineteenth century by Jeremy Bentham and
John Stewart Mill. It holds that that which is right is, as Francis Hutchison put it, what pro-
duces "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." ROLAND N. STROMBERG, EUROPEAN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY SINCE 1789 56 (6th ed. 1994). Therefore, maximizing personal util-
ity would be doing that which gives one the most pleasure. When applied to the economic
realm, utilitarianism reveals that a rational individual will not willfully engage in activity that
he believes will make him economically worse off.
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Rational individuals only engage in exchanges that are Pareto optimal, meaning that at
least one party is made better off, and no one is made worse off."°
For example, suppose A is a hat maker, and B is a farmer. A makes more hats than
he or his family can possibly wear, and B grows more food than his family can eat or
store. A would like to have food to put on his table, and B would like to have a hat
to keep the sun from scorching his head. Therefore, if A and B know of each others'
existence, they will likely engage in trade to satisfy both their needs. The extra hats are
of little value to A, but of great value to B, since he has none. Likewise, the extra food
is of little value to B, but of immense value to A to cure his hunger. Both give up
something they value less, for something they value more. Both parties are made better
by the exchange, and Pareto optimality has been achieved. This is the basic logic behind
the theory of exchange."
I0
The same logic applies to nations. The United States will not engage in trade that
will make it worse off. This would be irrational, and would not satisfy the theory of
Pareto optimality. Instead, the United States will engage in mutually beneficial trade with
its NAFTA partners.
(ii) Wal-Mart Illustration
The impact Wal-Mart stores are having in Mexico illustrates this point well.
Many mom-and-pop markets are purchasing food items for resale at Sam's Clubs,
because the warehouse outlets are able to provide those items cheaper than domestic
suppliers."'
Mom-and-pop markets are better off by purchasing these items at Sam's, and these
savings are passed on to Mexican consumers. This increases the purchasing power of
Mexican Consumers, because such savings free up income for other goods and services.
Thus, Mexicans are made better off.
Americans are better off with this transaction as well. Since Wal-Mart has the ability
to get goods to market cheaper than their Mexican competitors, Wal-Mart generates huge
profit. Wal-Mart is an American based company, which means those profits eventually
find their way back to stockholders in the United States, increasing their purchasing
power, and making them better off.
This scenario repeats itself in a number of different situations, such as Mexican
maquiladoras producing textile items more cheaply than American factories, and ship-
ping clothing to American retailers, and electronic items being manufactured more cost-
effectively in the United States and shipped to Mexico. Both nations are made better off
by these transactions.
109. See RENATO CIRILLO, THE ECONOMICS OF VILFREDO PARETO 42--60 (1979); VINCENT I. TARAS-
CIO, PARETO'S METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ECONOMICS 79--84 (1968).
110. CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 180 (James Dingwall and Bert K. Hoselitz, trans.,
The Free Press 1950); KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 96-106
(Frederick Engels ed., Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling trans., Modern Library 1st American
ed., 1906).
111. David Luhnow, Wal-Mart Wields Its Clubs, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 4, 2001, at 15, 2001
WL-WSJE 21836650.
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(iii) Persistence of Mercantilistic Thought
Ideas such as mercantilism still persist, and are preached by politicians, because the
general population lacks a basic understanding of the theory of exchange." 2 Many people
attribute economic improvement to scientific and industrial progress." 3 Others attribute
economic fortunes to labor unions, humanitarian legislation, or public education."4
While these institutions have had a positive impact on the American economy, the
simple fact is that they could not exist without freedom of exchange. Without market
incentives, there would be little in the way of scientific or industrial breakthroughs. Labor
unions would have no reason to exist, if capitalists did not hire workers to carry on
industry. Humanitarian legislation and public education would not be possible, without
the tax revenues generated by a capitalist market.
NAFTA affords the United States the opportunity to expand its wealth and well-
being by carrying on cross-border trade with Canada and Mexico. This opportunity is
hampered, however, by not opening our borders to Mexican trucks and allowing the free
flow of goods.
3. Safety
Safety appears to be American's primary concern. This is understandable considering
all of the publicity surrounding safety problems with Mexican trucks. Recent reports
have indicated a dramatic increase in fatalities in Texas border counties caused by trucks
with Mexican registrations. There has also been news of a Mexican truck causing a ten-
car pileup that killed four motorists north of San Diego."' These instances illustrate
legitimate concerns, but again, much of the rhetoric of Mexican trucks' lack of safety is
blown out of proportion.
a. TXDOT Study
The TXDOT study mentioned earlier is a case in point. It found that Mexican trucks
had a failure rate of 48.7 percent in Laredo and 77.4 percent in El Paso." 6 These numbers
sound disturbing until you give the study a closer look. Mexican trucks were deemed to
be unsafe, for instance, if they failed to carry a DOT identification number on the side
of the truck." 7 This study has also been called inaccurate and misleading, because the
trucks that were inspected were drayage equipment."' These trucks only transfer goods
from warehouses on one side of the border to the other." 9 They typically make three
to five trips a day, and many times the entire length of the trip is the bridge over the
112. LUDWIG VON MISES, THE ANTI-CAPITALISTIC MENTALITY 35, 36 (1956).
113. Id. at 36.
114. Nathaniel Branden, Common Fallacies About Capitalism, in CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN
IDEAL 72, 83 (Ayn Rand, ed., 1967).
115. Public Citizen, supra note 14.
116. Osio, supra note 10.
117. Id.; Ignore Fears Let Mexican Trucks Roll, supra note 19.
118. Osio, supra note 10; Ignore Fears Let Mexican Trucks Roll, supra note 19.
119. Data gathered from personal experience.
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Rio Grande. 2 ' These trucks are intended for short hauls in urban areas.' 21 They are
not the type of vehicles used for extended hauls into the United States, and were never
intended to meet those safety standards.'22
b. Inspector General's Audit
Like the TXDOT study, a safety audit conducted by the United States Inspector Gen-
eral revealed frightening numbers. The Inspector General's study found that 44 percent
of all Mexican trucks making deliveries in the United States failed safety inspections,
compared to only 20 percent of American trucks. 23 These numbers are skewed as well,
though. Only trucks with visible safety problems were pulled over. That means the audit
may not be representative of all Mexican trucks crossing the border. 24
c. California Data
Numbers provided by the California Highway Patrol (CHP) paint an entirely differ-
ent picture. CHP has processed 2.83 million commercial trucks through its Otay Mesa
commercial point of entry inspection station since December 4, 1995.121 CHP's numbers
reveal that 23.2 percent of Mexican trucks were placed out of service for safety reasons,
compared to 22.3 percent of Californian trucks.'26 The difference is only 0.9 percent.
This is not a bad result, especially when one considers that Mexican trucks are required
to meet California emission standards, carry U.S. liability insurance, and drivers must
have an international driver's license.
27
d. Canada's Roadcheck 96
Given these numbers, the failure rate for Mexican trucks is no worse than those of
Canadian trucks. A June 1996 study conducted by Canadian provincial and territorial
governments revealed a comparable failure rate that was somewhat higher than that
of Mexican trucks under the CHP numbers, and somewhat lower than those released
by the Inspector General. The study revealed a national failure rate of 32.6 percent
for Canadian big rigs. 2 s Two jurisdictions had failure rates in excess of the national
average. New Brunswick pulled 36.6 percent of trucks inspected off the road, followed
by Alberta, where 33.1 percent of trucks flunked inspection. 2 9 The safety inspections
120. Osio, supra note 10.
121. Id. However, this does not mean truck safety is not a legitimate concern in urban areas.
122. Ignore Fears Let Mexican Trucks Roll, supra note 19.
123. Higgs, Fletcher and Mack, LLP, Mexican Trucking Companies Continue to Negotiate Com-
plex Procedures as NAFTA Debate Continues, available at http://www.alfanet.org/articles/
article7.htm (last visited Aug. 24, 2001).
124. Id.
125. Osio, supra note 10.
126. Id.
127. Ignore Fears Let Mexican Trucks Roll, supra note 19.
128. Canadians for Responsible and Safe Highways, Big Trucks Again Fail Safety Checks, CRASH
COMMUNICATOR, Oct. 1996, available at http://www.web.net/-,crash/newsletter/oct96.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2002).
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revealed common problems with braking systems, load securing, suspension, tires, and
steering, among others. 130
The numbers released by CHP are logical. It is in Mexican firms' best interest to
comply with American law when their trucks are traveling highways in the United States.
Having a truck found in violation of United States law is a costly venture: the average fine
imposed on a Mexican truck violating American safety standards is $2000." Mexican
motor carriers have been turning to American law firms for advice on complying with
current restrictions.
132
e. Exemptions Currently Allow Many Mexican Trucks Access
to American Highways
Shockingly, Mexican trucks are already here. As noted earlier, most Mexican trucks
are limited to narrow commercial zones in urban areas along the United States-Mexico
border. 133 However, five Mexican trucking companies that were already operating in the
United States before 1982, when the ban on Mexican trucks went into effect, were grand-
fathered into NAFTA.13 The United States also exempted another 160 or so Mexican
trucking companies from the commercial-zone limit, giving them the right to oper-
ate throughout the United States. 13 American companies with Mexican subsidiaries are
also allowed to maintain private, not-for-hire trucking fleets based in Mexico, which are
allowed to operate in the United States. 36 While specific numbers are not available, DOT
indicates that these Mexican fleets have a failure rate below the United States average.' 37
B. POLITICS REARS ITS UGLY HEAD
As this comment has shown, most American concerns over the Mexican truck issue
are borne about by misconceptions. Many of these misconceptions have been fueled
by anti-NAFTA propaganda sponsored by organizations such as those involved in the
"Battle of Seattle,' who are opposed to any sort of economic globalization, and organized
labor unions, who want to keep a stranglehold on the U.S. job market. 13
130. Id.
131. Higgs, Fletcher and Mack, LLP, supra note 123.
132. Id.
133. Revision of Regulations, supra note 20, at 22,328.
134. Carter Dougherty, Mexican Truckers Travel U.S. Highways Trade Pact Allows Special Exemp-
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1. Trucking Unions Have Led the Battle to Keep the Border Closed
Trucking unions in both nations have an interest in making sure that the border
stays closed. In the United States, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (Teamsters)
has led the charge against opening the border to our southern neighbors. Teamsters
General President James P. Hoffa claims that the issue "is very much about highway
safety... ",139 Hoffa explains that "the American inspection regime is so inadequate that
less than 1 percent of the 4.5 million annual border crossings are inspected.'1 40 He goes
on to say that "[ulntil these shortcomings are adequately addressed on both sides of the
border, granting Mexican trucks full access to all of the U.S. and Canada is an invitation
to disaster."'
This is a weak argument, especially in light of the aftermath of the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks, after which all vehicles crossing the United States border were
inspected. 4 2 If the United States can put an inspection system in place overnight in
response to the threat of terrorism, it stands to reason that a much better inspection
system can be put in place with some advance planning to help spur free trade.
Canacar is opposed to opening the border as well.'43 They seem to be more honest
with themselves about its reasoning, however. Mexican truckers claim that opening the
border will kill their businesses due to lack of capital and higher costs of operation in
Mexico.' 44 On this issue, the union is at odds with President Fox, who they claim is not
speaking for Mexican truckers, but rather for American business. 45
2. Plans for Border Inspection System Halted
An inspection system was already in the works before the ban on Mexican trucks was
put into place. One hundred nine officers were added in Texas to handle border inspec-
tions.1 46 California spent $30 million building inspection centers.147 The DOT granted
border states $4 million for inspections. 41 Mexico set aside a portion of its World
Bank loan to improve border infrastructure.'49 Secretary Pefia and the Mexican Min-
ister of Transportation and Communication, Emilio Gamboa, signed a Memorandum
of Understanding that laid a blueprint for cooperation between American and Mexican
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officials. 5 ' Both nations also made an attempt to harmonize safety inspections and pre-
cautions. 5 ' Inspection stations were never built or staffed to their full potential, however,
since Mexican trucks were denied the right to travel American freeways.
3. Democrats Apparently Bend to Political Pressure
in Hope of Retaining White House
On the day that the border was scheduled to be opened, the DOT director for motor
carriers told reporters that "the DOT had put tough safety enforcement programs in
place and promised that Mexican trucks would be held to U.S. standards." 52 Secretary
Pefia called a press conference later in the day announcing a freeze on applications for
trucking permits from Mexican firms due to a lack of harmonization of safety stan-
dards.'53
The Teamsters had battled the border opening since the enactment of NAFTA.' 4
Interestingly, the Teamsters issued a press release commenting on the decision to place a
moratorium on processing applications of Mexican motor carriers hours before Secretary
Pefia's official announcement. 5 This fact, combined with the director of motor carri-
ers' previous announcement, and President Clinton's then-looming reelection campaign,
suggest that the decision was more politically based than on safety concerns.
The fact that similar sanctions were not placed on Canadian motor carriers also
suggests that the decision was political. As noted above, the Roadcheck 96 results in
Canada showed the number of Canadian trucks taken out of service, was similar to the
number of Mexican trucks found to have safety problems. 5 6 The fact that 1.4 million
Teamsters live in Canada, and none live in Mexico, makes the inference of political
motivation seem very likely."5 7
VII. Response From Washington, D.C.
Much debate has surrounded the issue of how to handle the NAFTA arbitration
panel's decision. The position of the White House has been that Mexican trucks should
be allowed to begin crossing the border in January 2002.158 The Bush administration
issued new rules in May 2001 permitting Mexican carriers to make deliveries of cargo
in the United States. 59 However, both houses of Congress voted to block the border
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States of America and the Secreteria de Comunicaciones y Transportes of the United Mexican
States of the Planning Process for the Land Transport, on Each Side of the Border (Apr. 29,
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TRIB.Bus. NEWS, Sept. 1, 2001, 2001 WL 27172718.
159. Helen Dewar, Senate Passes Mexican Truck Rules, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at A01.
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opening. In June 2001, the House voted to leave the current restrictions on Mexican
trucks in place. 6 ° The Senate followed suit when it passed the Murray/Shelby bill the
following August.' 6'
A. MURRAY/SHELBY BILL
The Murray/Shelby bill passed the Senate by a 70-30 vote. 16 2 Provisions of the bill
include:
* Barring funds from the DOT to process applications from Mexican trucking
companies until border crossings have 24/7 coverage.' 63
* Performing safety audits before any conditional operating authority is granted
to Mexican truckers.
164
* Scales are to be placed on the border to weigh all commercial vehicles entering
the United States. 6
5
* Truck drivers from Mexico are to comply with hours-of-service requirements. 66
* Provision of increased funding above the Bush administration's request to pro-
vide for inspectors and facilities. 67
* Requirement of an accessible database for monitoring safety performance of all
Mexican carriers applying for United States operating certificates. 61
The White House vowed to veto any version of a bill placing these kind of restric-
tions on Mexican trucks entering the country.' 69 Secretary of Transportation Norman
Mineta summed up the Bush administration's stance by saying: "[wie will not accept
enforcement requirements that create a de facto system that unfairly discriminates against
Mexican drivers and carriers."'7 °
B. HR 2299
It appeared that the Mexican-truck issue had dropped off of the political map after
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but Congress resumed discussion on the issue
in November. The product of the renewed discussion was the passage of a compromise
bill, H.R. 2299, that was signed into law December 18, 2001.
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H.R. 2299 allows for opening the border by January 1, 2002 as the Bush admin-
istration wished, but still contains safety provisions that members of Congress saw as
important.' 7 ' Like the Murray/Shelby bill, H.R. 2299 requires motor carriers to undergo
safety examinations before being granted authority to operate in the United States,
7 2
and Mexican carriers must observe U.S. hours-of-service requirements.'73 It differs dra-
matically, however, in other areas.
The most noticeable difference is that H.R. 2299 does not keep the border closed
until the entire inspection system is in place for round-the-clock service.'74 Instead,
it calls for opening the border in phases.' 75 Under the new law, Mexican carriers are
only allowed to enter the United States at commercial border crossings when inspectors
are on duty, and the inspection station has the capacity to do the inspections. 7 6 H.R.
2299 provides that the five border crossings with the most border volume be equipped
with weight-in-motion (WIM), systems to enforce vehicle-weight requirements and the
remaining five are to have equipment installed within a year.'77 These measures will
allow traffic to move across the southern border much more quickly than under other
proposals, and hopefully avert trade sanctions from Mexico.
Other provisions of H.R. 2299 include:
* Safety examinations must verify safety-management programs and available per-
formance data, drug and alcohol testing, compliance with hours-of-service rules,
proof of insurance, and driver qualifications;7 .
* Inspectors are required to review carriers' safety history data; evaluate carriers'
inspection, maintenance, and repair facilities; inspect commercial vehicles to be
operated in the United States; and interview carriers' management personnel;
79
* Mexican carriers must receive a satisfactory safety rating before being given
permanent authority to operate beyond border commercial zones;1
80
* Distinctive DOT numbers are to be given to trucks operating outside commer-
cial zones to assist in enforcing U.S. regulations;' 8 ' and
* Inspection of all vehicles, except those that have been granted operating author-
ity for three consecutive years, not bearing a Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
(CVSA) decal.8 2
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C. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS UNDER THE NEW RULES
As with all political compromises, H.R. 2299 has some provisions that will likely
cause problems. Two requirements in particular are likely to slow the flow of traffic across
the border. First, while H.R. 2299 allows Mexican motor carriers to cross at commercial
border crossings while inspectors are on duty, it prohibits transferring inspectors from
other parts of the country to the U.S.-Mexico border. 83 The law says inspectors are not
to be moved to ensure an adequate level of vehicle inspection nationwide.'84 This is a
sensible provision, but it will take time to hire and train new border inspectors, thus
delaying a free flow of traffic across the border.
Second, ambiguity over the insurance provision poses another problem with H.R.
2299. The law requires Mexican trucks to provide "proof of valid insurance with an
insurance company licensed in the United States: '"8 There is speculation in the insurance
industry as to what, exactly, this means.
The law is unclear on whether surplus lines, joint ventures with Mexican insurance
companies, or self-insurance would qualify."6 There is also a question of whether U.S.
insurance will even be available to Mexican motor carriers. Insurance companies require
information to write policies and hedge their risk.'87 Mexican carriers represent a new
market and there is little information available on the industry. 8 Without adequate
information, insurance companies are traditionally leery of writing policies due to the
unknown risk. 8 9
VIII. Civil Litigation
Even with new legislation paving the way for opening the border to Mexican trucks,
the issue is still far from resolved. The hotly contested trucking issue has led supporters
of NAFTA to accuse the treaty's detractors as having an "anti-Mexico" or "anti-Hispanic"
attitude. 90 The day following the passage of H.R. 2299, this rhetoric turned into action
when eleven Mexican trucking companies, filed a $4 billion lawsuit against the U.S.
government in federal district court in Brownsville.' The class-action suit was filed on
behalf of at least 185 Mexican trucking companies, and alleges that the United States
discriminated against them by denying permits to operate in the United States, and not
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IX. Conclusion
The NAFTA arbitration panel made a fair decision. The drafters of the treaty did a
sub-par job regarding trucking issues, and the panel did the best it could given the text
of NAFTA. While the United States does have the right to enforce its laws, and Mexico
entered the agreement knowing full well that the United States intended to do so, the
United States' blanket rejection of all applications to operate in the nation from Mexican
trucking companies is at odds with the stated intent of NAFTA.
The drafters of NAFTA intended the treaty to encourage the free flow of goods and
services across the borders of North American nations. The ban on allowing Mexican
trucks into the American interior hampers this intended result. The arbitration panel's
decision adheres to this intention by ruling that an outright ban on Mexican carriers
entering the United States, does not demonstrate good-faith actions under NAFTA. At
the same time, the decision allows the United States to use its discretion in choosing
which firms are likely to be able to meet its tough standards, and hence should be
allowed in the nation.
The United States' passage of H.R. 2299 was a fair response to the arbitration
panel's decision. The above analysis shows that it would be in the nation's best inter-
est to open the borders to Mexican trucks. This is true for two reasons. First, the
United States should honor its NAFTA commitments, and faces possible trade sanctions
if it fails to do so. The NAFTA arbitration panel gave Mexico the power to retaliate
against the United States, up to the same dollar amount of losses caused by the United
States' border closing.' 93 Mexico estimates these losses to be as high as $1 to $2 billion
annually.
194
Second, American motor carriers have more to gain than lose, by opening up to
competition the North American motor-cargo market. American trucking companies are
larger than their Mexican counterparts, thereby deriving lower costs and higher efficiency
through economies of scale. Loosening restrictions on the border would allow American
motor carriers to expand into Mexico, and develop dominance over a new market, similar
to what Wal-Mart has done in retail south of the border. 95
The above data also reveals that it would be impossible for Mexican truck drivers to
muscle their American counterparts out of the business, because of higher costs of busi-
ness in Mexico, and the comparative sizes of the Mexican and American motor-carrier
industries. The likely result would instead be that American truckers would dominate
the North American continent if they desired to do so.
The American public does not have to fear an onslaught of unsafe Mexican trucks
running over our children and taking our jobs. It is in a Mexican trucking firm's best
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interest to comply with American law, because it makes good business sense to do so.
Having trucks taken out of service north of the border would cost Mexican carriers in a
number of ways, including fines, increased repair costs, and revenue lost from downtime.
A number of violations would also cost a Mexican company its good reputation, and
possibly the right to operate in the United States.
X. Recommendations
While the tragedy of September 11, 2001 means that we now live in a different
world from the one in which the NAFTA truck debate arose, the United States has
properly taken the steps necessary to open the U.S.-Mexico border as soon as possible.
It is gratifying to see the United States re-embarking on its efforts to create a border-
inspection system. This effort is now more important than ever. American standards
should be strictly enforced on both the Mexican and Canadian borders; vehicles that do
not meet those standards should not be allowed in the country. However, vehicles that
meet American standards, and do not pose a security risk, should be allowed access to
the nation's highways to help spur the domestic economy, and further economic liber-
alization in Mexico. The United States and Mexico need to establish common trucking
standards to create an efficient cross-border transportation system. Intelligent transporta-
tion system technology was part of the original NAFTA plan, 196 and can be used to help
create an effective border inspection system today.
A. BORDER INSPECTIONS THROUGH INTELLIGENT
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
1. Lack of Inspections Facilities at Border Crossings
Probably the most legitimate of all of the arguments for keeping the border with
Mexico closed to Mexican motor carriers, is the lack of permanent inspection stations to
handle the inflow of trucks from south of the border. The United States has twenty-seven
border crossing sites with Mexico, but only two of those border crossings are equipped
with permanent full-time safety inspection stations. These border crossings are located
at Otay Mesa and Calexico, California, with two more under construction at Nogales,
Arizona and Santa Teresa, New Mexico. 197
Texas, which accounts for 69 percent of the NAFTA cross-border traffic,' 9t does
not operate any permanent weigh stations. Texas relies instead on a combination of
permanent, semi-portable, and portable scales to weigh approximately 269,000 trucks a
year.' 99 Public sentiment will likely require border states to beef up border inspection
facilities, when the doors are opened to Mexican trucks. Luckily, new technology will
likely make the border inspection process relatively quick and simple.
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2. Commercial Vehicle Information Systems: A Possible Solution
Border inspections can be accomplished with minimal hassle with the use of Com-
mercial Vehicle Information Systems (CVISN). CVISN, pronounced "see vision;' is an
attempt by the DOT to link Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) already in use,
into a unified information-sharing system. 20 0 The ITS program was launched in the
early 1990s, and some form of ITS has been deployed in fifty-five of the seventy-five
largest metropolitan areas in the United States.20" ITS technology has been used by var-
ious government agencies for electronic toll-collection, traffic-signal priority, automatic
vehicle-counting, and other uses. 20 2 The private sector has also used ITS devices such
as ONSTARTM for keyless entry into vehicles, automated identification of automobiles
involved in accidents, and remote diagnostics, as well as other applications.
20 3
a. What is CVISN?
CVISN is a collection of communication networks and information systems like
those just mentioned.2' The network includes information systems owned and oper-
ated both by private industry, and state and federal governments.2 " It will allow motor
carriers and government agencies to exchange information and transact business elec-
tronically.2 6 CVISN gives truckers pass-through ability at weigh stations and at safety
and credential checks.
20 7
b. How Does CVISN Work?
In the CVISN system, transponders in the trucks transmit information to comput-
ers at inspection stations immediately, allowing inspectors to check weight and safety
records. 2" These transponders can be programmed to transmit information on safety,
taxes, weight, permitting, driver, and freight information. 20 9 This technology likely could
be implemented at the United States-Mexico border.
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c. Advantages of CVISN
CVISN would offer numerous advantages over manual inspection at the border
with Mexico. For instance, allowing trucks to do pass through inspections would greatly
reduce congestion at inspection stations, and law-enforcement personnel could concen-
trate more effort on high-risk vehicles. E10 This would help alleviate concerns about con-
gestion and environmental pollution at the border, and should help assure the American
public that only safe vehicles are allowed to enter the country.
Another advantage of CVISN over manual inspection, is that once the technology is
in place, the inspection process becomes much simpler. Standardized exchanges of data
allow for seamless movement of trucks between states or even nations.2" CVISN gives
inspectors access to national and state databases, containing a motor carrier's safety and
performance record, and gives truckers a one-stop shop for motor-carrier credentials.2"2
CVISN is also economically efficient. Data indicates that the use of CVISN has
resulted in a 75 percent reduction in credentialing costs for both industry and govern-
ment. 21 3 Kentucky, for instance, estimates a savings of $20 per credential inspection.2 14
CVISN has created a cost/benefit savings for motor carriers ranging from 4 to 1 up
to 20 to 1 depending on carrier size.2"' Studies have also shown that CVISN tech-
nology has paid for itself in reduced administrative costs in states where it has been
implemented.21 6
d. Current CVISN Implementation
Maryland and Virginia are the prototype states for the CVISN program. 21 7 Eight
other states, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon,
and Washington, began a model deployment in 1996.218 Thirty-four other states have
completed CVISN architectures.21 9 The technology is gaining widespread acceptance.
Congress should meet its goal of having CVISN adopted in a majority of the states by
2003.20
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3. Recommendations for Implementing CVISN
at the U.S.-Mexico Border
By now the potential benefits of CVISN should be evident. While the technology
is being implemented throughout the United States, some additional steps need to be
taken to apply the technology to U.S.-Mexico cross-border transportation.
a. Build Permanent Inspection Stations
First, permanent inspection stations need to be built along the border. Out of
twenty-seven border-crossing sites, there are only two permanent truck-inspection sta-
tions.22' The problem is even worse in Texas. Texas accounts for fifteen of the twenty-
seven border crossings and absorbs 69 percent of the traffic,222 yet it has no permanent
truck-inspection stations anywhere in the state.223 A lack of permanent inspection sta-
tions makes it difficult to implement CVISN technology.
Since CVISN could solve many of the problems associated with opening the southern
border, Congress should appropriate sufficient funds to construct and maintain CVISN-
enabled inspection stations along the United States-Mexico border. While the up-front
cost would likely be greater than hiring additional personnel to do manual inspections
of trucks at the border (which seems to be the U.S. government's best proposal for
handling the situation), there would be long-term economic benefits from implement-
ing CVISN. The government would save money by requiring fewer inspectors to staff
inspection stations, and the trucking industry would save money due to less downtime
spent at inspection stations. These savings would ripple through the economy, and make
any product transported into the United States by truck from Mexico cheaper for the
American consumer. Border communities would also benefit from the implementation
of CVISN through reductions in traffic congestion, and environmental pollution, both
of which can be viewed as negative externalities created by the long lines, likely at border
crossings if manual inspections of all trucks is required.224
b. Require Mexican Motor-Carriers to Equip Trucks
with CVISN-Compliant Transponders
A second step to applying CVISN would be Congress passing a law requiring Mexican
motor carriers to equip their trucks with transponders in order to enter the United States.
This would be permissible under the NAFTA arbitration panel's decision, which stated
that different standards could be applied to international trucks, to ensure that they com-
ply with American law. Along with this step, the United States will need to create a
database to track the records of Mexican trucks. Adopting these suggestions would allow
for speedy border inspections, and keep dangerous vehicles off the road. Trucks would
be able to pass through border crossings unimpeded if all of their credential, weight, and
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safety information were verified. Otherwise, trucks would be flagged down for manual
inspection, or denied entry into the nation.
c. Protection of Privacy
Third, a system would need to be put into place to protect the privacy of truck
drivers. CVISN would conceivably allow government agents to track a truck's every
move.22 This is understandably a major concern in the trucking industry, because
nobody likes to be snooped on every second. Several recent law review articles have
addressed this subject.226 However, the technology's ability to pinpoint a truck anywhere
on the map, could be considered an advantage in the world after September 11 th, given
fears of foreign terrorists" use of trucks for carrying our their plots.
4. CVISN Best Option
Given the advantages of CVISN, Congress should appropriate sufficient capital to
put an ITS inspection system in place at both borders of the nation. Such a system
would help ensure that only safe commercial vehicles are allowed to enter the United
States. A system of this sort could help alleviate threats from abroad, because trucks
lacking the proper credentials would not be allowed into the nation. An ITS system of
this sort would also be within the spirit of the recently passed H.R. 2299, which calls for
implementation of similar technology with the use of WIM systems.
2 7
B. CLARIFICATION OF RULES
Another obvious step that needs to be taken before the border can truly be opened
is a clarification of the H.R. 2299 rules passed by Congress. At the time this article was
written, certain provisions of the rules are unclear, such as the insurance provision men-
tioned above. Confusion over the meaning of certain rules could postpone the opening
of the border, and give further credence to private lawsuits seeking damages for the delay
in opening the border. Fortunately, there is still ample time for the DOT to clarify the
meaning of the rules before the anticipated March 2002 border opening.
XI. Summary
The United States has not acted in good faith under NAFTA by denying Mexican
motor carriers access to U.S. highways. A NAFTA arbitration panel found in favor of
Mexico on this issue, ordering the United States to open its border or face economic
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226. For a discussion of privacy issues see A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN.
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(2000); Thomas B. Kearns, Technology and the Right to Privacy: The Convergence of Surveil-
lance and Information Privacy Concerns, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 975 (1999).
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sanctions. This paper has shown that it would be in the best economic interest of the
United States to open the border to Mexican trucks. Mexican trucks are, on average, as
safe as American and Canadian trucks. Opening the border would streamline the distri-
bution system saving the American consumer money at the checkout. While there are
still a few snags that need to be ironed out before the opening of the border, technology
currently in use by many states can help speed the process, and get goods rolling across
the border.
